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Abstract
Moral responsibility is a major concern in auto-
mated decision-making, with applications rang-
ing from self-driving cars to kidney exchanges.
From the viewpoint of automated systems, the
urgent questions are: (a) How can models of
moral scenarios and blameworthiness be ex-
tracted and learnt automatically from data? (b)
How can judgements be computed tractably,
given the split-second decision points faced by
the system? By building on deep tractable prob-
abilistic learning, we propose a learning regime
for inducing models of such scenarios automat-
ically from data and reasoning tractably from
them. We report on experiments that compare
our system with human judgement in three illus-
trative domains: lung cancer staging, teamwork
management, and trolley problems.
1 INTRODUCTION
Moral responsibility is a major concern in automated
decision-making. In applications ranging from self-driving
cars to kidney exchanges [Conitzer et al., 2017], contextu-
alising and enabling judgements of morality and blame is
becoming a difficult challenge, owing in part to the philo-
sophically vexing nature of these notions. In the infamous
trolley problem [Thomson, 1985], for example, a putative
agent encounters a runaway trolley headed towards five in-
dividuals who are unable to escape the trolley’s path. Their
death is certain if the trolley were to collide with them.
The agent, however, can divert the trolley to a side track
by means of a switch, but at the cost of the death of a sixth
individual, who happens to be on this latter track. While
one would hope that in practice the situations encountered
by, say, self-driving cars would not involve such extreme
choices, providing a decision-making framework with the
capability of reasoning about blame seems prudent.
Moral reasoning has been actively studied by philosophers,
lawyers, and psychologists for many decades. Especially
when considering quantitative frameworks,1 a definition of
responsibility that is based on causality has been argued
to be particularly appealing [Chockler and Halpern, 2004].
But most of these definitions are motivated and instantiated
by carefully constructed examples designed by the expert,
and so are not necessarily viable in large-scale applications.
Indeed, problematic situations encountered by automated
systems are likely to be in a high-dimensional setting, with
hundreds and thousands of latent variables capturing the
low-level aspects of the application domain. Thus, the ur-
gent questions are:
(a) How can models of moral scenarios and blameworthi-
ness be extracted and learnt automatically from data?
(b) How can judgements be computed tractably, given the
split-second decision points faced by the system?
In this work, we propose a learning regime for in-
ducing models of moral scenarios and blameworthi-
ness automatically from data, and reasoning tractably
from them. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first of such proposals. The regime leverages the
tractable learning paradigm [Poon and Domingos, 2011,
Choi et al., 2015, Kisa et al., 2014], which can induce both
high- and low- tree width graphical models with latent vari-
ables, and thus realises a deep probabilistic architecture
[Pronobis et al., 2017]. We remark that we do not motivate
any new definitions for moral responsibility, but show how
an existing model can be embedded in the learning frame-
work. We suspect it should be possible to analogously em-
bed other definitions from the literature too. We then study
the computational features of this regime. Finally, we re-
port on experiments regarding the alignment between au-
tomated morally-responsible decision-making and human
judgement in three illustrative domains: lung cancer stag-
ing, teamwork management, and trolley problems.
1The quantitative nature of the framework used in this work
implicitly takes a consequentialist stance when it comes to the
normative ethical theory used to assess responsibility and blame,
and we also rely on our utility functions being cardinal as opposed
to merely ordinal. See, for example, [Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015]
and [Strotz, 1953] for definitions and discussions on these
stances.
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2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Blameworthiness
We use the word blameworthiness to capture an impor-
tant part of what can more broadly be described as moral
responsibility, and consider a set of definitions (taken di-
rectly from the original work, with slight changes in no-
tation for the sake of clarity and conciseness) put for-
ward by [Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018] (henceforth
HK). In HK, environments are modelled in terms of
variables and structural equations relating their values
[Halpern and Pearl, 2005]. More formally, the variables
are partitioned into exogenous variables X external to the
model in question, and endogenous variables V that are
internal to the model and whose values are determined
by those of the exogenous variables. A range function R
maps every variable to the set of possible values it may
take. In any model, there exists one structural equation
FV : ×Y∈X∪V\{V}R(Y)→ R(V) for each V ∈ V.
Definition 1. A causal model M is a pair (S,F ) where
S is a signature (U,V,R) and F is a set of modifiable
structural equations {FV : V ∈ V}. A causal setting is a
pair (M, X) where X ∈ ×X∈XR(X) is a context.
In general we denote an assignment of values to variables in
a set Y as Y. Following HK, we restrict our considerations
to recursive models, in which, given a context X, the values
of all variables inV are uniquely determined.
Definition 2. A primitive event is an equation of the form
V = v for some V ∈ V, v ∈ R(V). A causal formula
is denoted [Y ← Y]ϕ where Y ⊆ V and ϕ is a Boolean
formula of primitive events. This says that if the variables
in Y were set to values Y (i.e. by intervention) then ϕ
would hold. For a causal formula ψ we write (M, X)  ψ
if ψ is satisfied in causal setting (M, X).
An agent’s epistemic state is given by (Pr,K , U) where K
is a set of causal settings, Pr is a probability distribution
over this set, and U is utility function U : W → R≥0 on
the set of worlds, where a world w ∈ W is defined as a
setting of values to all variables in V. wM,X denotes the
unique world determined by the causal setting (M, X).
Definition 3. We define how much more likely it is that
ϕ will result from performing a than from a′ using:
δa,a′,ϕ = max
[ ∑
(M,X)∈J[A←a]ϕK Pr(M, X)
−
∑
(M,X)∈J[A←a′]ϕK Pr(M, X)
]
, 0

where A ∈ V is a variable identified in order to capture an
action of the agent and JψK = {(M, X) ∈ K : (M, X)  ψ}
is the set of causal settings in which ψ (a causal formula) is
satisfied.
The costs of actions are measured with respect to a set of
outcome variables O ⊆ V whose values are determined
by an assignment to all other variables. In a given causal
setting (M, X), OA←a denotes the setting of the outcome
variables when action a is performed and wM,O←OA←a,X de-
notes the corresponding world.
Definition 4. The (expected) cost of a relative to O is:
c(a) =
∑
(M,X)∈K
Pr(M, X)
[
U(wM,X) −U(wM,O←OA←a,X)
]
Finally, HK introduce one last quantity N to measure how
important the costs of actions are when attributing blame
(this varies according to the scenario). Specifically, as N →
∞ then dbN(a, a′,ϕ) → δa,a′,ϕ and thus the less we care
about cost. Note that blame is assumed to be non-negative
and so it is required that N > maxa∈Ac(a).
Definition 5. The degree of blameworthiness of a for ϕ
relative to a′ (given c and N) is:
dbN(a, a′,ϕ) = δa,a′,ϕ
N −max(c(a′) − c(a), 0)
N
The overall degree of blameworthiness of a for ϕ is then:
dbN(a,ϕ) = maxa′∈R(A)\{a}dbN(a, a′,ϕ))
For reasons of space we omit an example here, but include
several when reporting the results of our experiments. For
further examples and discussions, we refer the reader to
HK.
2.2 PSDDs
Since, in general, probabilistic inference is intractable
[Bacchus et al., 2009], tractable learning has emerged as
a recent paradigm where one attempts to learn classes of
Arithmetic Circuits (ACs), for which inference is tractable
[Gens and Pedro, 2013, Kisa et al., 2014]. In particular, we
use Probabilistic Sentential Decision Diagrams (PSDDs)
[Kisa et al., 2014] which are tractable representations of
a probability distribution over a propositional logic the-
ory (a set of sentences in propositional logic) represented
by a Sentential Decision Diagram (SDD). Space precludes
us from discussing SDDs and PSDDs in detail, but the
main idea behind SDDs is to factor the theory recursively
as a binary tree: terminal nodes are either 1 or 0, and
the decision nodes are of the form (p1, s1), . . . , (pk, sk)
where primes p1, . . . , pk are SDDs corresponding to the
left branch, subs s1, . . . , sk are SDDs corresponding to the
right branch, and p1, . . . , pk form a partition (the primes
are consistent, mutually exclusive, and their disjunction
p1 ∨ ... ∨ pk is valid). In PSDDs, each prime pi in a de-
cision node (p1, s1), . . . , (pk, sk) is associated with a non-
negative parameter θi such that
∑k
i=1 θi = 1 and θi = 0 if
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and only if si = ⊥. Each terminal node also has a a param-
eter θ such that 0 < θ < 1, and together these parameters
can be used to capture probability distributions. Most sig-
nificantly, probabilistic queries, such as conditionals and
marginals, can be computed in time linear in the size of the
model. PSDDs can be learnt from data [Liang et al., 2017],
possibly with the inclusion of logical constraints standing
for background knowledge. The ability to encode logical
constraints into the model directly enforces sparsity which
in turn can lead to increased accuracy and decreased size.
In our setting, we can draw parallels between these log-
ical constraints and deontological ethical principles (e.g.
it is forbidden to kill another human being), and between
learnt distributions over decision-making scenarios (which
can encode preferences) and the utility functions used in
consequentialist ethical theories.
3 BLAMEWORTHINESS VIA PSDDS
We aim to leverage the learning of PSDDs, their tractable
query interface, and their ability to handle domain con-
straints for inducing models of moral scenarios.2 This is
made possible by means of an embedding that we sketch
below, while also discussing assumptions and choices. At
the outset, we reiterate that we do not introduce new defi-
nitions here, but show how an existing one, that of HK, can
be embedded within a learning regime.
3.1 Variables
We first distinguish between scenarios in which we do and
do not model outcome variables. In both cases we have
exogenous variables X, but in the former the endogenous
variables V are partitioned into decision variables D and
outcome variablesO, and in the latter we haveV = D = O
(this does not affect the notation in our definitions, how-
ever). This is because we do not assume that outcomes can
always be recorded, and in some scenarios it makes sense
to think of decisions as an end in themselves.
The range function R is defined by the scenario we model,
but in practice we one-hot encode the variables and so the
range of each is simply {0, 1}. A subset (possibly empty) of
the structural equations in F are implicitly encoded within
the structure of the SDD underlying the PSDD, consisting
of the logical constraints that remain true in every causal
model M. The remaining equations are those that vary de-
pending on the causal model. Each possible assignment D,
O given X corresponds to a set of structural equations that
2Our technical development can leverage both parame-
ter and (possibly partial) structure learning for PSDDs. Of
course, learning causal models is a challenging problem
[Acharya et al., 2018], and in this regard, probabilistic structure
learning is not assumed to be a recipe for causal discovery in gen-
eral [Pearl, 1998]. Rather, under the assumptions discussed later,
we are able to use our probabilistic model for causal reasoning.
combine with those encoded by the SDD to determine the
values of the variables in V given X. The PSDD then cor-
responds to the probability distribution overK , compacting
everything neatly into a single structure.
Our critical assumption here is that the signature S =
(U,V,R) (the variables and the values they may take) re-
mains the same in all models, although the structural equa-
tions F (the ways in which said variables are related) may
vary. Given that each model represents an agent’s uncertain
view of a decision-making scenario we do not think it too
restrictive to keep the elements of this scenario the same
across the potential eventualities, so long as the way these
elements interact may differ. Indeed, learning PSDDs from
decision-making data requires that the data points measure
the same variables each time.
3.2 Probabilities
Thus, our distribution Pr : ×Y∈X∪D∪OR(Y) → [0, 1]
ranges over assignments to variables instead of K . As a
slight abuse of notation we write Pr(X, D, O). The key
observation needed to translate between these two distri-
butions (we denote the original as PrHK) and which re-
lies on our assumption above is that each set of structural
equations F together with a context X deterministically
leads to a unique, complete assignment V of the endoge-
nous variables, which we write (abusing notation slightly)
as (F , X) |= V, though there may be many such sets of
equations that lead to the same assignment. Hence, for any
context X and any assignment Y for Y ⊆ V we have:
Pr(X, Y) =
∑
F :(F ,X)|=Y
PrHK(F , X)
We view a Boolean formula of primitive events (pos-
sibly resulting from decision A) as a function ϕ :
×Y∈O∪D\{A}R(Y) → {0, 1} that returns 1 if the original for-
mula is satisfied by the assignment, or 0 otherwise. We
write D\a for a general vector of values over D \ {A}, and
hence ϕ(D\a, O). Here, the probability of ϕ occurring
given that action a is performed (i.e. conditioning on inter-
vention)
∑
(M,X)∈J[A←a]ϕK Pr(M, X) given by HK can also
be written as Pr(ϕ|do(a)). In general, it is not the case
that Pr(ϕ|do(a)) = Pr(ϕ|a), but by assuming that the di-
rect causes of action a are captured by the context X and
that the other decisions and outcomes D\a and O are in
turn caused by X and a we may use the back-door crite-
rion [Pearl, 2009] with X as a sufficient set to write:
Pr(D\a, O|do(a)) =
∑
X
Pr(D\a, O|a, X) Pr(X)
and thus may use
∑
D\a,O,X ϕ(D\a, O) Pr(D\a, O|a, X) Pr(X)
for Pr(ϕ|do(a)). In order not to re-learn a separate model
for each scenario we also allow the user of our system the
option of specifying a current, alternative distribution over
contexts Pr′(X).
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3.3 Utilities
We now consider the utility function U, the output of which
we assume is normalised to the range [0, 1].3 We avoid un-
necessary extra notation by defining the utility function in
terms of X, D, and O = (O1, ..., On) instead of worlds w.
In our implementation we allow the user to input an exist-
ing utility function or to learn one from data. In the latter
case the user further specifies whether or not the function
should be context-relative, i.e. whether we have U(O) or
U(O; X) (our notation) as, in some cases, how good a cer-
tain outcome O is depends on the context X. Similarly,
the user also decides whether the function should be linear
in the outcome variables, in which case the final utility is
U(O) =
∑
i Ui(Oi) or U(O; X) =
∑
i Ui(Oi; X) respec-
tively (where we assume that each Ui(Oi; X), Ui(Oi) ≥ 0).
Here the utility function is simply a vector of weights and
the total utility of an outcome is the dot product of this vec-
tor with the vector of outcome variables.
When learning utility functions, the key assumption we
make (before normalisation) is that the probability of a cer-
tain decision being made given a context is linearly propor-
tional to the expected utility of that decision in the con-
text. Note that here a decision is a general assignment
D and not a single action a. For example, in the case
where there are outcome variables, and the utility func-
tion is both linear and context-relative, we assume that
Pr(D|X) ∝ ∑i Ui(Oi; X) Pr(Oi|D, X). The linearity of this
relationship is neither critical to our work nor imposes any
real restrictions on it, but simplifies our calculations some-
what and means that we do not have to make any further as-
sumptions about the noisiness of the decision-making sce-
nario, or how sophisticated the agent is with respect to mak-
ing utility-maximising decisions. The existence of a pro-
portionality relationship itself is far more important. How-
ever, we believe this is, in fact, relatively uncontroversial
and can be restated as the simple principle that an agent is
more likely to choose a decision that leads to a higher ex-
pected utility than one that leads to a lower expected utility.
If we view decisions as guided by a utility function, then it
follows that the decisions should, on average, be consistent
with and representative of that utility function.
3.4 Costs and Blameworthiness
We also adapt the cost function given in HK, denoted
here by cHK . As actions do not deterministically lead
to outcomes in our work, we cannot use OA←a to rep-
resent the specific outcome when decision a is made
(in some context). For our purposes it suffices to use
c(a) = −∑O,X U(O; X) Pr(O|a, X) Pr(X) or c(a) =
−∑O,X U(O) Pr(O|a, X) Pr(X), depending on whether U
3This has no effect on our calculations as we only use cardi-
nal utility functions with bounded ranges, which are invariant to
positive affine transformation.
is context-relative or not. This is simply the negative ex-
pected utility over all contexts, conditioning by interven-
tion on decision A ← a. Using our conversion between
PrHK and Pr, the back-door criterion [Pearl, 2009], and our
assumption that action a is not caused by the other en-
dogenous variables (i.e. X is a sufficient set for A), it is
straightforward to to show that this cost function is equiv-
alent to the one in HK (with respect to determining blame-
worthiness scores).4 Again, we also give the user the op-
tion of updating the distribution over contexts Pr(X) to
some other distribution Pr′(X) so that the current model
can be re-used in different scenarios. Given δa,a′,ϕ and c,
both dbN(a, a′,ϕ) and dbN(a,ϕ) are computed as in HK,
although we instead require that N > −mina∈Ac(a) (the
equivalence of this condition to the one in HK is an easy
exercise). With this the embedding is complete.
4 COMPLEXITY RESULTS
Given our concerns over tractability we provide several
computational complexity results for our embedding. Basic
results were given in [Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018],
but only in terms of the computations being polynomial in
|M|, |K|, and |R(A)|. Here we provide more detailed results
that are specific to our embedding and to the properties of
PSDDs. The complexity of calculating blameworthiness
scores depends on whether the user specifies an alternative
distribution Pr′, although in practice this is unlikely to have
a major effect on tractability. Finally, note that we assume
here that the PSDD and utility function are given in ad-
vance and so we do not consider the computational cost of
learning. A summary of our results is given in Table 1.
Term Time Complexity
δa,a′,ϕ O(2|X|+|D|+|O|(|ϕ|+ |P|))
c(a) O(2|X|+|O|(U + |P|))
dbN(a, a′,ϕ) O(2|X|+|O|(U + 2|D|(|ϕ|+ |P|)))
dbN(a,ϕ) O(|R(A)|2|X|+|O|(U + 2|D|(|ϕ|+ |P|)))
Table 1: Time complexities for each of the key terms that
we compute. If the user specifies an extra distribution Pr′
over contexts, then the complexity is given by the expres-
sions below with each occurrence of the term |P| replaced
by |P|+ Q, where O(Q) is the time taken to evaluate Pr′.
Here, O(|P|) is the time taken to evaluate the PSDD P
where |P| is the size of the PSDD, measured as the num-
ber of parameters; O(U) is the time taken to evaluate the
utility function; and O(|ϕ|) is the time taken to evaluate
the Boolean function ϕ, where |ϕ| measures the number
of Boolean connectives in ϕ. We observe that all of the
final time complexities are exponential in the size of at
4In particular, it suffices to use c(a′) − c(a) = cHK(a′) −
cHK(a).
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least some subset of the variables. This is a result of the
Boolean representation; our results are, in fact, more tightly
bounded versions of those in HK, which are polynomial in
the size of |K| = O(2|X|+|D|+|O|). In practice, however, we
only sum over worlds with non-zero probability of occur-
ring. Using PSDDs allows us to exploit this fact in ways
that other models cannot, as we can logically constrain the
model to have zero probability on any impossible world.
Thus, when calculating blameworthiness we can ignore a
great many of the terms in each sum and speed up compu-
tation dramatically. To give some concrete examples, the
model counts of the PSDDs in our experiments were 52,
4800, and 180 out of 212, 221, and 223 possible variable
assignments, respectively.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
The underlying motivation behind our system was that a
user should be able to go from any stage of creating a model
to generating blameworthiness scores as conveniently and
as straightforwardly as possible. With this in mind our
package runs from the command line and prompts the user
for a series of inputs including: data; existing PSDDs,
SDDs, or vtrees; logical constraints; utility function spec-
ifications; variable descriptions; and finally the decisions,
outcomes, and other details needed to compute a particular
blameworthiness score. These inputs and any outputs from
the system are saved and thus each model and its results can
be easily accessed and re-used if needed. Note that we as-
sume each datum is a sequence of fully observed values for
binary (possibly as a result of one-hot encoding) variables
that correspond to the context, the decisions made, and the
resulting outcome, if recorded.
Our implementation makes use of two existing re-
sources: [The SDD Package 2.0, 2018], an open-source
system for creating and managing SDDs, including com-
piling them from logical constraints; and LearnPSDD
[Liang et al., 2017], a recently developed set of algorithms
that can be used to learn the parameters and structure of PS-
DDs from data, learn vtrees from data, and to convert SDDs
into PSDDs. The resulting functionalities of our system can
then be broken down into four broad areas:
• Building and managing models, including converting
logical constraints specified by the user in simple in-
fix notation to restrictions upon the learnt model. For
example, (A ∧ B) ↔ C can be entered as a command
line prompt using =(&(A,B),C).
• Performing inference by evaluating the model or by
calculating the MPE, both possibly given partial evi-
dence. Each of our inference algorithms are linear in
the size of the model, and are based on pseudocode
given in [Kisa et al., 2014] and [Peharz et al., 2017]
respectively.
• Learning utility functions from data, whose proper-
ties (such as being linear or being context-relative)
are specified by the user in advance. This learning
is done by forming a matrix equation representing our
assumed proportionality relationship across all deci-
sions and contexts, then solving to find utilities using
non-negative linear regression with L2 regularisation
(equivalent to solving a quadratic program).
• Computing blameworthiness by efficiently calculating
the key quantities from our embedding, using parame-
ters from particular queries given by the user. Results
are then displayed in natural language and automati-
cally saved for future reference.
A high-level overview of the complete structure of the sys-
tem and full documentation are included in a package,
which will be made available online.
6 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
Using our implementation we learnt several models using a
selection of datasets from varying domains in order to test
our hypotheses. In particular we answer three questions in
each case:
(Q1) Does our system learn the correct overall probability
distribution?
(Q2) Does our system capture the correct utility function?
(Q3) Does our system produce reasonable blameworthiness
scores?
Full datasets are available as part of the package and sum-
maries of each (including the domain constraints underly-
ing our datasets) are given in the appendix.
6.1 Lung Cancer Staging
We use a synthetic dataset generated with the
lung cancer staging influence diagram given in
[Nease Jr and Owens, 1997]. The data was generated
assuming that the overall decision strategy recommended
in the original paper is followed with some high probability
at each decision point. In this strategy, a thoractomy is
the usual treatment unless the patient has mediastinal
metastases, in which case a thoractomy will not result
in greater life expectancy than the lower risk option of
radiation therapy, which is then the preferred treatment.
The first decision made is whether a CT scan should
be performed to test for mediastinal metastases, the
second is whether to perform a mediastinoscopy. If the
CT scan results are positive for mediastinal metastases
then a mediastinoscopy is usually recommended in order
to provide a second check, but if the CT scan result is
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negative then a mediastinoscopy is not seen as worth the
extra risk involved in the operation. Possible outcomes
are determined by variables that indicate whether the
patient survives the diagnosis procedure and survives the
treatment, and utility is measured by life expectancy.
For (Q1) we measure the overall log likelihood of the mod-
els learnt by our system on training, validation, and test
datasets (see Table 2). A full comparison across a range of
similar models and learning techniques is beyond the scope
of our work here, although to provide some evidence of the
competitiveness of PSDDs we include the log likelihood
scores of a sum-product network (SPN) as a benchmark.
We follow a similar pattern in our remaining experiments,
each time using Tachyon [Kalra, 2017] (an open source li-
brary for SPNs) to produce an SPN using the same train-
ing, validation, and test sets of our data, with the standard
learning parameters as given in the Tachyon documenta-
tion example. We also compare the sizes (measured by the
number of nodes) and the log likelihoods of PSDDs learnt
with and without logical constraints in order to demonstrate
the effectiveness of the former approach. Our model is able
to recover the artificial decision-making strategy well (see
Figure 1); at most points of the staging procedure the model
learns a very similar distribution over decisions, and in all
cases the correct decision is made the majority of times.
Model Training Validation Test Size
PSDD* -2.047 -2.046 -2.063 134
1 PSDD -2.550 -2.549 -2.564 436
SPN -3.139 -3.143 -3.158 1430
PSDD* -5.541 -5.507 -5.457 370
2 PSDD -5.637 -5.619 -5.556 931
SPN -7.734 -7.708 -7.658 3550
PSDD* -4.440 -4.510 -4.785 368
3 PSDD -6.189 -6.014 -6.529 511
SPN -15.513 -16.043 -15.765 3207
Table 2: Log likelihoods and sizes of the constrained PS-
DDs (the models we use in our system, indicated by the *
symbol), unconstrained PSDDs, and the SPNs learnt in our
three experiments.
Answering (Q2) here is more difficult as the given utilities
are not necessarily such that our decisions are linearly pro-
portional to the expected utility of that decision. However,
our strategy was chosen so as to maximise expected utility
in the majority of cases. Thus, when comparing the given
life expectancies with the learnt utility function, we still
expect the same ordinality of utility values, even if not the
same cardinality. In particular, our function assigns max-
imal utility (1.000) to the successful performing of a tho-
ractomy when the patient does not have mediastinal metas-
tases (the optimal scenario), and any scenario in which the
patient dies has markedly lower utility (mean value 0.134).
In attempting to answer (Q3) we divide our question into
two parts: does the system attribute no blame in the correct
cases?; and does the system attribute more blame in the
cases we would expect it to (and less in others)? Needless
to say, it is very difficult (perhaps even impossible, at least
without an extensive survey of human opinions) to produce
an appropriate metric for how correct our attributions of
blame are, but we suggest that these two criteria are the
most fundamental and capture the core of what we want
to evaluate. We successfully queried our model in a va-
riety of settings corresponding to the two questions above
and present representative examples below (we follow this
same pattern in our second and third experiments).
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Figure 1: A comparison between the five probability val-
ues specified in our data generation process and the corre-
sponding values learnt by our system from this data.
Regarding the first part of (Q3), one case in which we have
blameworthiness scores of zero is when performing the ac-
tion being judged is less likely to result in the outcome we
are concerned with than the action(s) we are comparing it
to. The chance of the patient dying in the diagnostic pro-
cess (¬S DP) is increased if a mediastinoscopy (M) is per-
formed, hence the blameworthiness for such a death due to
not performing a mediastinoscopy should be zero. As ex-
pected, our model assigns dbN(¬M, M,¬S DP) = 0. To
answer the second part of (Q3), we show that the system
produces higher blameworthiness scores when a negative
outcome is more likely to occur (assuming the actions be-
ing compared have relatively similar costs). For example,
in the case where the patient does not have mediastinal
metastases then the best treatment is a thoractomy, but a
thoractomy will not be performed if the result of the last
diagnostic test performed is positive. The specificity of a
mediastinoscopy is higher than that of a CT scan, hence
a CT scan is more likely to produce a false positive and
thus (assuming no mediastinoscopy is performed as a sec-
ond check) lead to the wrong treatment.5 In the case where
5Note that even though a mediastinoscopy has a higher cost (as
the patient is more likely to die if it is performed), it should not
be enough to outweigh the test’s accuracy in this circumstance.
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only one diagnostic procedure is performed we therefore
have a higher degree of blame attributed to the decision to
conduct a CT scan (0.013) as opposed to a mediastinoscopy
(0.000), where we use N = 1.
6.2 Teamwork Management
Our second experiment uses a recently collected dataset
of human decision-making in teamwork management
[Yu et al., 2017]. This data was recorded from over 1000
participants as they played a game that simulates task al-
location processes in a management environment. In each
level of the game the player has different tasks to allocate to
a group of virtual workers that have different attributes and
capabilities. The tasks vary in difficulty, value, and time
requirements, and the player gains feedback from the vir-
tual workers as tasks are completed. At the end of the level
the player receives a score based on the quality and time-
liness of their work. Finally, the player is asked to record
their emotional response to the result of the game in terms
of scores corresponding to six basic emotions. We sim-
plify matters slightly by considering only the self-declared
management strategy of the player as our decisions. Within
the game this is recorded by five check-boxes at the end of
the level that are not mutually exclusive, giving 32 possible
overall strategies. These strategy choices concern meth-
ods of task allocation such as load-balancing (keeping each
worker’s workload roughly even) and skill-based (assign-
ing tasks by how likely the worker is to complete the task
well and on time), amongst others. We also measure utility
purely by the self-reported happiness of the player, rather
than any other emotions.
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Figure 2: The log probability assigned to each possible de-
cision strategy across all contexts by our model, compared
to the log proportion of times each strategy was used in
the six levels of the game by participants. Strategies are
sorted in ascending order by their proportion of use in level
1 and gaps in each plot represent strategies never used in
that game level.
As part of our answer to (Q1) we investigate how often
the model would employ each of the 32 possible strategies
(where a strategy is represented by an assignment of values
to the binary indicator decision variables) compared to the
average participant (across all contexts), which can be seen
in Figure 2. In general the learnt probabilities are similar
to the actual proportions in the data, though noisier. The
discrepancies are more noticeable (though understandably
so) for decisions that were made very rarely, perhaps only
once or twice in the entire dataset. These differences are
also partly due to smoothing (i.e. all strategies have a non-
zero probability of being played).
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Figure 3: Each point is a decision strategy in a level of the
game; we compare the proportion of times it is used against
the average self-reported utility that results from it. Each
line is a least-squares best fit to the points in that level.
For (Q2) we use the self-reported happiness scores to in-
vestigate our assumption that the number of times a deci-
sion is made is (linearly) proportional to the expected utility
based on that decision. In order to do this we split the data
up based on the context (game level) and produce a scat-
ter plot (Figure 3) of the proportion of times a set of deci-
sions is made against the average utility (happiness score)
of that decision. Overall there is no obvious positive lin-
ear correlation as our original assumption would imply, al-
though this could be because of any one or combination of
the following reasons: players do not play enough rounds
of the game to find out which strategies reliably lead to
higher scores and thus (presumably) higher utilities; play-
ers do not accurately self-report their strategies; or players’
strategies have relatively little impact on their overall utility
based on the result of the game. We recall here that our as-
sumption essentially comes down to supposing that people
more often make decisions that result in greater utilities.
The eminent plausibility of this statement, along with the
relatively high likelihood of at least one of the factors in
the list above means we do not have enough evidence here
to refute the statement, although certainly further empirical
work is required in order to demonstrate its truth.
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Investigating this discrepancy further, we learnt a utility
function (linear and context-relative) from the data and in-
spected the average weights given to the outcome variables
(see right plot in Figure 4). A correct function should place
higher weights on the outcome variables corresponding to
higher ratings, which is true for timeliness, but not quite
true for quality as the top rating is weighted only third
highest. We found that the learnt utility weights are in fact
almost identical to the distribution of the outcomes in the
data (see left plot in Figure 4). Because our utility weights
were learnt on the assumption that players more often use
strategies that will lead to better expected outcomes, the
similarity between these two graphs adds further weight to
our suggestion that, in fact, the self-reported strategies of
players have very little to do with the final outcome.
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Figure 4: A comparison of the learnt utility weights for
each of the outcome variables (to the right) and the propor-
tion of times each outcome occurs in the data (to the left).
To answer (Q3) we examine cases in which the blame-
worthiness score should be zero, and then compare cases
that should have lower or higher scores with respect to one
another. Once again, comprehensive descriptions of each
of our tested queries are omitted for reasons of space, but
here we present some representative examples.6 Firstly, we
considered level 1 of the game by choosing an alternative
distribution Pr′ over contexts when generating our scores.
Here a player is less likely to receive a low rating for qual-
ity (Q1 or Q2) if they employ a skill-based strategy where
tasks are more frequently allocated to better workers (S ).
As expected, our system returns dbN(S ,¬S , Q1∨Q2) = 0.
Secondly, we look at the timeliness outcomes. A player is
less likely to obtain the top timeliness rating (T5) if they do
not use a strategy that uniformly allocates tasks (U) com-
pared to their not using a random strategy of allocation (R).
Accordingly, we find that dbN(¬U,¬T5) > dbN(¬R,¬T5),
and more specifically we have dbN(¬U,¬T5) = 0.002 and
dbN(¬R,¬T5) = 0 (i.e. a player should avoid using a ran-
dom strategy completely if they wish to obtain the top time-
liness rating).
6In all of the blameworthiness scores below we use the cost
importance measure N = 1.
6.3 Trolley Problems
We also devised our own experimental setup with human
participants, using a small-scale survey (the relevant doc-
uments and data are included in the package) to gather
data about hypothetical moral decision-making scenarios.
These scenarios took the form of variants on the infa-
mous trolley problem [Thomson, 1985]. We extended
this idea, as is not uncommon in the literature (see, e.g.
[Moral Machine, 2016]), by introducing a series of differ-
ent characters that might be on either track: one person,
five people, 100 people, one’s pet, one’s best friend, and
one’s family. We also added two further decision options:
pushing whoever is on the side track into the way of the
train in order to save whoever is on the main track, and
sacrificing oneself by jumping in front of the train, saving
both characters in the process. The survey then took the
form of asking each participant which of the four actions
they would perform (the fourth being inaction) given each
possible permutation of the six characters on the main and
side tracks (we assume that a character could not appear on
both tracks in the same scenario). The general setup can
be seen in Figure 5, with locations A and B denoting the
locations of the characters on the main track and side track
respectively.
Figure 5: A cartoon given to participants showing the lay-
out of the experimental scenario and the four possible op-
tions. Clockwise from top (surrounding the face symbol)
these are: sacrificing oneself, flipping the switch, inaction,
and pushing the character at B onto the main track. Loca-
tions A and B are instantiated by particular characters de-
pending on the context.
Last of all, we added a probabilistic element (which was
explained in advance to participants) to our scenarios
whereby the switch only works with probability 0.6, and
pushing the character at location B onto the main track in
order to stop the train succeeds with probability 0.8. This
was used to account for the fact that people are generally
more averse to actively pushing someone than to flipping a
switch [Singer, 2005], and people are certainly more averse
to sacrificing themselves than doing either of the former.
However, depending on how much one values the character
on the main track’s life, one might be prepared to perform
a less desirable action in order to increase their chance of
survival.
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In answering (Q1) we investigate how well our model
serves as a representation of the aggregated decision prefer-
ences of participants by calculating how likely the system
would be to make particular decisions in each of the 30
contexts and comparing this with the average across partic-
ipants in the survey. For reasons of space we focus here
on a representative subset of these comparisons: namely,
the five possible scenarios in which the best friend char-
acter is on the main track (see Figure 6). In general, the
model’s predictions are similar to the answers given in the
survey, although the effect of smoothing our distribution
during learning is noticeable, especially due to the fact that
the model was learnt with relatively few data points. De-
spite this handicap, the most likely decision in any of the
30 contexts according to the model is in fact the majority
decision in the survey, with the ranking of other decisions
in each context also highly accurate.
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Figure 6: A comparison of the decisions made by partici-
pants and the predictions of our model in each of the five
scenarios in which the best friend character is on the main
track (A).
Unlike our other two experiments, the survey data does
not explicitly contain any utility information, meaning our
system was forced to learn a utility function by using the
probability distribution encoded by the PSDD. Within the
decision-making scenarios we presented, it is plausible that
the decisions made by participants were guided by weights
that they assigned to the lives of each of the six characters
and to their own life. Given that each of these is captured
by a particular outcome variable we chose to construct a
utility function that was linear in said variables. We also
chose to make the utility function insensitive to context, as
we would not expect how much one values the life of a par-
ticular character to depend on which track that character
was on, or whether they were on a track at all.
For (Q2), with no existing utility data to compare our learnt
function, we interpreted the survival rates of each charac-
ter as the approximate weight assigned to their lives by the
participants. While the survival rate is a non-deterministic
function of the decisions made in each context, we assume
that over the experiment these rates average out enough
for us to make a meaningful comparison with the weights
learnt by our model. A visual representation of this com-
parison can be seen in Figure 7. It is immediately obvi-
ous that our system has captured the correct utility function
to a high degree of accuracy. With that said, our assump-
tion about using survival rates as a proxy for real utility
weights does lend itself to favourable comparison with a
utility function learnt from a probability distribution over
contexts, decisions, and outcomes (which thus includes sur-
vival rates). Given the setup of the experiment, however,
this assumption seems justified and, furthermore, to be in
line with how most of the participants answered the survey.
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Figure 7: A comparison between the average survival rates
of the seven characters (including the participants in the
survey), normalised to sum to one, and the corresponding
utility function weights learnt by our system.
Because of the symmetric nature of the set of contexts in
our experiment, the probability of a particular character
surviving as a result of a particular action across all con-
texts is just the same as the probability of that character not
surviving. Hence in answering (Q3) we use our system’s
feature of being able to accept particular distributions Pr′
over the contexts in which we wish to attribute blame, al-
lowing us to focus only on particular scenarios. Clearly,
in any of the possible contexts one should not be blamed
at all for the the death of the character on the main track
for flipping the switch (F) as opposed to inaction (I), be-
cause in the latter case they will die with certainty, but not
in the former.7 Choosing a scenario arbitrarily to illustrate
this point, with one person on the side track and five peo-
ple on the main track, we have dbN(F, I,¬L5) = 0 and
dbN(F,¬L5) = 0.307 (with our measure of cost impor-
tance N = 0.762, 1.1 times the negative minimum cost of
any action).
7Note that this is not to say one would not be blameworthy
when compared to all other actions as one could, for example,
have sacrificed oneself instead, saving all other lives with cer-
tainty.
Deep Tractable Probabilistic Models for Moral Responsibility
Now consider the scenario in which there is a large crowd
of a hundred or so people on the main track, but one is un-
able to tell from a distance if the five or so people on the
side track are strangers or one’s family. Of course, the more
likely it is that the family is on the side track, the more re-
sponsible one is for their deaths (¬LFa) if one, say, flips the
switch (F) to divert the train. Conversely, we would also
expect there to be less blame for the deaths of the 100 peo-
ple (¬L100) say, if one did nothing (I), the more likely it
is that the family is on the side track (because the cost, for
the participant at least, of somehow diverting the train is
higher). We compare cases where there is a 0.3 probability
that the family is on the side track against a 0.6 probabil-
ity and for all calculations use the cost importance measure
N = 1. Therefore, not only would we expect the blame
for the death of the family to be higher when pulling the
switch in the latter case, we would expect the value to be
approximately twice as high as in the former case. Ac-
cordingly, we compute values dbN(F,¬LFa) = 0.264 and
dbN(F,¬LFa) = 0.554 respectively. Similarly, when con-
sidering blame for the deaths of the 100 people due inac-
tion, we find that dbN(I,¬L100) = 0.153 in the former case
and that dbN(I,¬L100) = 0.110 in the latter case (when the
cost of performing any other action is higher).
7 RELATED WORK
Our work here is differentiated from related efforts in two
main ways: jointly addressing the automated learning of
models of moral scenarios, and tractable reasoning. We
discuss other efforts below.
As mentioned before, we do not motivate new defini-
tions for moral responsibility here, but draw on HK,
which, in turn, is based upon [Chockler and Halpern, 2004]
and the work on causality in [Halpern and Pearl, 2005].
Their framework is also related to the intentions model
in [Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2015] which considers predic-
tions about the moral permissibility of actions via influ-
ence diagrams, though there is no emphasis on learn-
ing or tractability. In fact, the use of tractable archi-
tectures for decision-making itself is recent (see, e.g.
[Bhattacharjya and Shachter, 2012, Melibari et al., 2016]).
The authors in [Choi et al., 2015] learn PSDDs over pref-
erence rankings (as opposed to decision-making scenarios
more generally), though their approach does not take ac-
count of different preferences in different contexts.
An important part of learning a model of moral
decision-making is in learning a utility function. This
is often referred to as inverse reinforcement learning
(IRL) [Ng and Russell, 2000] or Bayesian inverse plan-
ning [Baker et al., 2009]. Our current implementation con-
siders a simple approach for learning utilities (similar to
[Nielsen and Jensen, 2004]), but more involved paradigms
such as those above could indeed have been used.
Our contributions here are related to the body of
work surrounding MIT’s Moral Machine website
[Moral Machine, 2016]. For example, [Kim et al., 2018]
build on the theory of [Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2017] by
developing a computational model of moral decision-
making whose predictions they test against Moral Machine
data. Their focus is on learning abstract moral principles
via hierarchical Bayesian inference, and although our
framework can be used to these ends, it is also flexible
with respect to different contexts, and allows constraints
on learnt models. [Noothigattu et al., 2017] develop a
method of aggregating the preferences of all participants
(again, a secondary feature of our system) in order to make
a given decision. However, due to the large numbers of
such preference orderings, tractability issues arise and so
sampling must be used.
Finally, a high-level overview of strategies for creating
moral decision-making frameworks for automated systems
is discussed in [Conitzer et al., 2017], and similar consider-
ations regarding hybrid collective decision-making systems
are made by [Greene et al., 2016]. We refer the reader to
these works for more discussions.
8 CONCLUSION
Our system utilises the specification of decision-making
scenarios in HK, and at the same time exploits many of the
desirable properties of PSDDs (such as tractability, seman-
tically meaningful parameters, and the ability to be both
learnt from data and include logical constraints). The sys-
tem is flexible in its usage, allowing various inputs and
specifications. In general, the models in our experiments
are accurate representations of the distributions over the
moral scenarios that they are learnt from. Our learnt utility
functions, while simple in nature, are still able to capture
subtle details and in some scenarios are able to match hu-
man preferences with high accuracy using very little data.
With these two elements we are able to generate blamewor-
thiness scores that are, prima facie, in line with human intu-
itions. We hope that our work here goes some way towards
bridging the gap between the existing philosophical work
on moral responsibility and the existing technical work on
decision-making in automated systems.
Appendix
The full set of supplementary materials, source code, and
extended discussions on much of our work presented here
are included within a package, which will be made avail-
able online. Here we provide brief summaries of the three
datasets used in our experiments, including the variable
encoding used for each domain and the underlying con-
straints.
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No. data points 360
No. variables 23
X variables One Person On Track A (A1), ... ,
Family On Track A (AFa), One Per-
son On Track B (B1), ... , Family
On Track B (BFa)
D Inaction (I), Flip Switch (F), Push
B (P), Sacrifice Oneself (S )
O One Person Lives (L1), ... , Family
Lives (LFa), You Live (LY )
Constraints
∨
i∈{1,...,Fa} Ai,
∨
i∈{1,...,Fa} Bi,
¬(Ai ∧ Bi) for all i ∈ {1, ..., Fa},
Ai → ¬∨ j∈{1,...,Fa}\i A j
for all i ∈ {1, ..., Fa},
Bi → ¬∨ j∈{1,...,Fa}\i B j for all
i ∈ {1, ..., Fa}, ∨D∈{N,F,P,S } D,
D → ¬∨D′∈{N,F,P,S }\D D′,
(Ai ∧ N) → ¬Li for all
i ∈ {1, ..., Fa}, (Bi ∧ N) → Li for
all i ∈ {1, ..., Fa}, Li → (Ai ∨ Bi)
for all i ∈ {1, ..., Fa},
(S ∧ (Ai ∨ Bi)) → Li for all
i ∈ {1, ..., Fa}, LY ↔ ¬S , (Li ∧
(P ∨ F)) → ¬∨ j∈{1,...,Fa}\i L j
for all i ∈ {1, ..., Fa},
(¬Li ∧ (P∨ F))→ ∨ j∈{1,...,Fa}\i L j
for all i ∈ {1, ..., Fa}
Model count 180
Utilities given? No
Table 3: A summary of the trolley problem data used in our
third experiment.
No. data points 7446
No. variables 21
X variables Level 1 (L1), ... , Level 6 (L6)
D variables Other (O), Load-balancing (L),
Uniform (U), Skill-based (S ), Ran-
dom (R)
O variables Timeliness 1 (T1), ... , Timeliness 5
(T5), Quality 1 (Q1), ... , Quality 5
(Q5)
Constraints
∨
i∈{1,...,6} Li, Li → ¬∨ j∈{1,...,6}\i L j
for all i ∈ {1, ..., 6}, ∨i∈{1,...,5} Ti,
Ti → ¬∨ j∈{1,...,5}\i T j for all
i ∈ {1, ..., 5}, ∨i∈{1,...,5} Qi, Qi →
¬∨ j∈{1,...,5}\i Q j for all i ∈ {1, ..., 5}
Model count 4800
Utilities given? Yes (Self-reported Happiness
Score)
Table 4: A summary of the teamwork management data
used in our second experiment.
No. data points 100000
No. variables 12
X variables Mediastinal Metastases (MM),
CT Positive (CT+), CT Neg-
ative (CT−), No CT (CTN/A),
Mediastinoscopy Positive (M+),
Mediastinoscopy Negative (M−),
No Mediastinoscopy (MN/A)
D variables Perform CT (CT ), Perform Medi-
astinoscopy (M)
O variables Perform Thoractomy (T ), Diag-
nosis Procedures Survived (S DP),
Treatment Survived (S T )
Constraints (CT+ ∨ CT−) ↔ CT , CTN/A ↔
¬CT , (M+ ∨M−) ↔ M, MN/A ↔
¬M, M− → T , M+ → ¬T , (CT− ∧
¬M) → T , (CT+ ∧ ¬M) →
¬T , ¬S DP → M, ¬(CT+ ∧CT−),
¬(M+ ∧M−), ¬S DP → ¬S T
Model count 52
Utilities given? Yes (Life Expectancy)
Table 5: A summary of the lung cancer staging data used
in our first experiment.
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